The general policing and intelligence environment, similarly, has a direct bearing on the execution of terrorist acts, and on the terrorist calculus of success, failure and impact. Significantly, with a threat like terrorism, it is not sufficient to try to secure principally urban targets alone - as is the overwhelming direction of present responses.
The Architecture of Failure
Terrorist conspiracies are mounted, attacks are prepared, and perpetrators are deployed through, areas of the poorest policing, across the chaos of India's rural and mofussil expanse. It is here that networks take root and find sympathisers, support and sustenance, when the urban environment becomes operationally 'difficult'. And it is here that the hard slog of CT, the systematic penetration of networks of sympathisers, supporters and cadres, and the dismantling of this complex, has to be executed.
As long as terrorist networks find spaces to thrive within an environment of ineffective policing, the challenge of 'delivering' a terrorist attack to an urban target will never be insurmountable. This, then, is the fundamental error: shifting the focus to the institutional architecture of CT without settling the most basic questions of strategy, objectives, priorities and orientation. Our principal problems lie, not in architecture, but in manpower, materials and execution. We have eviscerated our institutions over decades, and now believe that the solution lies in creating layer upon layer of meta-institutions to 'monitor', 'coordinate' and 'oversee' this largely dysfunctional apparatus.
Because we are immersed in routine tasks, we neglect the need for change and innovation. The truth, in fact, is the exact opposite. It is the quality, content, relevance and thoroughness of our 'routine' that will define our capacities for CT success. You cannot address higher order deficits and deficiencies unless the 'routine' is efficiently taken care of.
In fact, while glaring deficits in 'routine' functions and capacities persist, an emphasis on meta-institutional and 'architectural' transformations becomes an evasion, an alibi for not addressing the immediate and greater crisis of basic capacities, capabilities and functions.
There is no ideal configuration or distribution of powers and functions, no grand or novel 'architecture' that can produce optimal results.
Failed Architecture # Beyond Failure — Volume
The crisis is one of efficiency. Governance and administration in India - including internal security management - have failed to evolve any systems - any 'routines' - to maintain efficiency or impose accountability, and are currently operating against the imperatives of even the most rudimentary principles of management or administration. Vast resources are wasted where they produce little positive outcome. Initiatives and structures that could produce the best results are, at the same time, rejected or starved of resources. Even where leakages and inefficiencies have been well-documented, these are not corrected.
It has not mattered whether this has occurred in centrally administered projects and agencies or in state administered projects and agencies.
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Mere structural, architectural or constitutional redistribution of powers, functions and responsibility, will achieve nothing unless issues of capacity, efficiency and accountability are addressed - in that order. It is the regrettable truth that policing has been tremendously neglected by most State Governments, and there is now an enveloping crisis of capacities. Unless State Governments explicitly recognize the primacy of policing and of law and order management in any system of efficient governance, there is little scope for improvement.
If we are to confront and defeat proxy war, terrorism and insurgency, we must create Police Forces across India that are professional, efficient, well-resourced and accountable. It is tragic that international perceptions, today, see the Police in India as a "broken system" reflecting nothing more than "dysfunction, abuse and impunity". What is needed, now, is comprehensive modernization, not just incremental upgradation of technologies. While technological inputs will be crucial, modern policing is not the outcome of technologies alone.
It is the Policeman - his training, orientation, capabilities and, crucially, mindset - that makes the difference between a modern and an obsolete Police Force. It is, consequently, the profile of the Policeman - his education, training, skills and orientation - of course, but also his welfare and status in society that must undergo comprehensive revaluation. The 'beat constable' here, is shorthand for the complex tasks of general policing and intelligence work, the very 'routines' that we tend to dismiss with contempt.
This does not mean, of course, that innovation is to be shelved. It is clear that existing 'routines' are failing to achieve the objectives of general law and order administration as well as CT, and need transformation. However, we cannot, in this situation, cherry pick our preferred 'innovations' from international examples, or randomly from CT literature, or along personal proclivities and preferences, or along technologies and innovations that powerful vendors are trying to market.
Our innovations must arise out of the documented deficits and failures of our existing 'routines', and the specificities of the projected challenges they are intended to meet. There is little publicly available evidence to suggest that this has, in fact, been the case with any of our innovations or acquisitions over the past years.
We cannot, moreover, talk about strategic innovations without defining our basic strategy - and there is little sign of a coherent CT strategy on the horizon. Of course, irrespective of the efficacy of our general policing and intelligence system, or of any 'routines' and protocols we may establish in the foreseeable future, terrorist plots will result in at least occasional success.
It is at this juncture that Special Forces, QRTs, and coordination, command and control mechanisms come into play. It is important, first, to recognize that such a situation already represents a CT failure. Further, our assessment of innovative alternatives must be built on clear scenarios of terrorism and response, and not on generalized models borrowed from other countries, or constructed on untested theoretical positions.
For instance, Special Forces and QRTs would appear to have some natural utility, particularly in containing the undue protraction of an incident. However, is this evaluation based on ad hoc comparison of existing general force capabilities and optimal Special Force capabilities, or on demonstrable advantages on the ground? But was this decision based on an objective evaluation of NSG performance after it arrived on the scene? On an evaluation of the NSG response over nearly 52 hours that followed?
police-risk-management.com/order/online/fozoj-e-possibile.php This does not appear to be the case. Moreover, has any effort ever been made to assess the comparative preventive efficacy of an improved general policing system, as against creation of Special Forces? The potential of a terrorist attack is ordinarily realized within its first minutes, well before any rational timeframe of deployment of commando or QRT units. Has such a scenario been 'gamed' to arrive at an objective assessment of response priorities and alternative models of 'innovation'?
I do not think so. None of this is intended to argue that we need not look at the 'architecture' of security, or at 'radical' institutional innovations and developments. Rather, it is a question of settling priorities; and of excluding the risk of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. The system certainly calls for an overhaul.
It is not, however, clear that such transformation needs to begin with the 'framework'. I would suggest that a focus on capacities and processes within existing institutions would bring far more tangible benefits in the near and medium term, rather than the sweeping structural changes that are currently advocated. Moreover, at least some of the proposed 'architectural' elements are unviable, redundant, or unlikely to achieve critical mass in any timeframe that would be relevant to our CT imperatives.
There is often a facile response to this: why can't we do both - basic capacity development and 'architectural innovation' - together? The simple answer to this is, because we lack the resources to do so at the scales necessary, and within timeframes imposed by the challenge of terrorism. Flinging thousands of crores in all directions is not going to serve any real purpose.
While financial caps may be one of the possible impediments to simultaneous developments across existing and proposed systems, the most significant obstacle to the realization of a 'radical architecture', as already indicated, is the country's and the Governments' human resource profile, and the multiple barriers to its rapid enhancement. Other factors would include technology and rates of absorption; the pace of process and administrative evolution; and the psychological resistance to change that will be felt at all levels of transformation.
If we are to prioritize necessary transformations, consequently, it is content that must be given precedence over form. The crisis in India today is one of capacities, and this cannot be addressed by the reinvention of institutional forms. It doesn't matter if our responses are centralised or decentralised, as long as the executive agencies remain infirm, under-manned, under-trained and under-equipped.
Issues of mandate and structure will become relevant only after the issues of capacity and capability have been addressed. Theoretically, however, even if the capacities issue is addressed, centralization would still tend to fail in the very complex and vast Indian system, as well as the country's political and cultural environment.
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Given India's size and diversity, a centralized authority is necessary - and already exists in the form of the Government of India, and within it, the UMHA. However, since national security administration involves complex and multifarious functions, these can only be addressed through delegation to a progressively decentralised structure, with clear mandate and accountability.
No single agency or authority could ever effectively tackle all aspects of national security management across the length and breadth of the country without turning into a colossal bureaucratic nightmare. National security is, of course, a national issue - but that does not necessarily imply that it is a 'central' Union Government issue.
There is no reason to believe that the States are 'anti-national', or are incapable of tackling issues just because they have trans-State ramifications. India is certainly not an impotent state - and this has been proven in victories against terrorists in the past, certainly in Punjab, 19 and more recently in Tripura 20 and Andhra Pradesh This experience needs to be studied in great details, and its lessons must be widely understood within the security community - not in reductionist slogans, as is often the present case, but in the full complexity of the dynamics of terrorism and CT.
India has the power, but fails both because of the lack of political will and a tremendous incoherence in strategy. There has to be a far more profound and better informed strategic and policy discourse in the country before the Government can be held to account for its persistent failures to do what very obviously needs to be done. The priorities of our CT responses are easily derived from the preceding arguments, and it must be clear that a wide range of initiatives can be taken by the Police leadership itself, though, quite naturally, with some support from State Governments, and the Centre's financial backing.
It is useful to highlight some of the immediate possibilities: The highest priority must be given to improving the profile of the average Policeman in the street.
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While tremendous emphasis is now rightly placed on Police-population ratios, numbers are not everything. This is dramatically borne out by the experience in Andhra Pradesh. In , Andhra Pradesh was among the States worst afflicted by Maoist violence, with all 23 of its Districts in acute crisis. As the charge on a capacitor is subjected to leakage, the data saved on the DRAM is lost within the stipulated time.
A flash memory can be erased electrically and hence is a non-volatile storage medium. Flash-based solid state drives enable data to be manipulated at the page level and hence making the read and write more convenient. The controller acts as a bridge for communication between the memory and the computer. A controller is responsible for the execution of code at firmware level and has other functionality as mentioned below:.
A memory generally a NAND based flash memory is widely preferred by manufacturers for its durability rather than its speed. A memory is segregated into blocks and each block is segregated into pages. The information of cache is manipulated by the controller. A battery sometimes a capacitor is used to back the cache for flushing the data into memory in case of abrupt power loss. An interface is the physical bus or connector line which connects the computer and the SSD. There are several interface standards available and the interface has a great influence on the transfer speeds of data.
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